외교부

Distinguished Participants,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

Good morning.

I am indeed delighted to be speaking in front of delegations from 21 countries as we open the 2012 Operational Experts Group (OEG) Meeting of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). First of all, I would like to extend a warm welcome to all the distinguished participants, in particular to delegates from all over the world who have traveled a long way to be here.

(The Effectiveness and Development of the PSI)

Ladies and Gentlemen,

In today’s globalized and technologically advanced world, the threat of WMD remains real and significant. Consequently, the prevention of the proliferation of WMD has been at the very top of the international security agenda. Indeed, a single act of nuclear terrorism anywhere in the world would have catastrophic consequences for all of us.

Since its launch in 2003, the Proliferation Security Initiative has developed into an effective tool to halt the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). To date, the number of participants which have endorsed the “Interdiction Principles of the PSI” has increased from about a dozen countries to 101 countries. It is also credited with a number of meaningful interdictions to counter the proliferation of WMD. The sailing back of the M/V Light last year, a North Korean cargo ship suspected of transporting sensitive materials, could be considered as one of the most recent exemplary cases of close coordination between PSI participants.

The PSI, which is based on a non-binding agreement and voluntary participation, is now widely accepted by the international community and has become an important instrument to achieve the goal of combating WMD proliferation by complementing the existing non-proliferation regime and effectively blocking illegal WMD proliferation activities. Of course, with the PSI, we cannot stop all those activities but it definitely has made it more difficult for potential proliferators to do their deadly business.

(Current Challenges in WMD Proliferation)

Proliferation threats could emanate from both state actors and non-state actors. The nuclear programs by some countries such as North Korea and Iran pose a threat to international peace and security. The North Korean nuclear issue continues to pose a grave challenge to the international non-proliferation regime and the peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and beyond. Despite the firm and united message from the international community, North Korea is continuing to defy its obligations by strengthening its nuclear capabilities and engaging in dangerous proliferation activities. There is also growing concern over the Iranian nuclear issue as the prospect for a negotiated solution remains uncertain.

Furthermore, the WMD proliferation to and by non-state actors has come to the fore as one of the most urgent issues the international community has to deal with. WMD in the hands of terrorists may lead to a global disaster. In recent years, revelations of an illicit trade network led to greater awareness of the need to properly respond to potential threats from non-state actors. Worse still, terrorist organizations seeking to acquire and employ WMD cannot be deterred through traditional and territory-based diplomatic, economic or military means.

(Korea’s Contribution to the PSI)

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The Korean Government has embraced the building of a “Global Korea” as the goal to guide its path towards the future. This means Korea willingly assumes the responsibility in every aspect commensurate with its growing role in the international community. In this vein, joining the PSI is in keeping with the spirit of a “Global Korea.”

Since joining the PSI in 2009, the Korean Government has been proactively participating in the relevant PSI activities. Korea hosted a regional workshop and a maritime exercise respectively in 2010. We will continue to work together with other PSI partners to prevent the proliferation of WMD and related materials.

(Future Tasks of the PSI)

While international efforts to prevent WMD proliferation have strengthened, there remain many challenges and tasks ahead in the PSI. As rapid technological development, larger volumes of trade and increasingly sophisticated of proliferation methods have complicated our endeavors, we cannot afford to be complacent.

For the effective and efficient implementation of the Principles of the PSI, I suggest a few areas in which our common efforts should be focused.

First, even if the PSI so far has successfully expanded its participation since its launch as a partnership of like-minded countries, we need to strive to encourage more countries to participate in this important effort. With the participation of a great number of countries, the PSI’s reach and capabilities will increase. We should make sure that non-participants gain a correct understanding of the PSI by strengthening outreach activities, underlining that the PSI is consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks, including the UN Security. At the same time, recent efforts to strengthen interdiction capabilities of participating states based on the concept of Critical Capabilities and Practices (CCP) should be duly taken note of, as a method of further consolidating PSI activities.

Second, strengthening cooperation and coordination with the UN Security Council Sanctions Committees, Interpol, the GICNT (Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism), the Global Partnership, and other non-proliferation regimes including export control regimes could be explored for the further development of the PSI. In particular, it is worthy of note that 58 world leaders agreed to take action against the illicit trade in nuclear materials at the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit last March, thus supporting the aim of the PSI. Considering that limited resources are available to implement all the necessary activities of the PSI, this will enhance the overall effectiveness of the PSI.

Finally the PSI could accord further consideration to the financing aspect of WMD proliferation. At the Conference on Financing of Proliferation of WMD last May in Seoul, it was pointed out that close international cooperation on this subject would be complementary to the counter-proliferation efforts through physical interdiction.

(Concluding Remarks)

Hosting the OEG Meeting and the Eastern Endeavor 12 in Busan will offer a great opportunity to demonstrate to the international community our strong commitment to the non-proliferation of WMD.

Once again, I would like to express my deep appreciation to each representative for your active participation. I am sure that this meeting will contribute to strengthening the effectiveness and better management of the PSI. It is also my sincere hope that the Seoul OEG Meeting proves highly fruitful and that the maritime exercise in Busan shall be successfully conducted.

Thank you for your attention.

외교통상부 이(가) 창작한 PSI 운영 전문가 그룹회의 환영사 저작물은 "공공누리" 출처표시-상업적이용금지-변경금지 조건에 따라 이용 할 수 있습니다.