외교부

Opening Statement by H.E. Chun Yung-woo at 2010 OSCE-ROK Conference
 
Building a Mechanism for Multilateral Security Cooperation
in Northeast Asia

Opening Statement by
Ambassador CHUN Yung-woo
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Seoul, 18 May 2010

Deputy Minister Konstantin Zhigalov, Special Envoy of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office,
Secretary General Marc Perrin de Brichambaut ,
Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Korea, I would like to extend a warm welcome to all of you. 
My Government greatly values the partnership with the OSCE. We look forward to working closely with the OSCE so that we can draw from your experiences and lessons in building a mechanism for multilateral security cooperation in our part of the world. Recognizing that global security is indivisible, we welcome and appreciate the OSCE’s outreach to other regions or Asian partners.

I had the honor of addressing the last OSCE-ROK Conference in Seoul five years ago. And today I would like to update you on new developments in the meantime and take a reality check on where we are and what challenges lie ahead.

The Republic of Korea has a vital stake in establishing a multilateral security cooperation mechanism in our region. Indeed, we place great value on any arrangement whatsoever that can strengthen peace and security in Northeast Asia. There are ample reasons why the ROK is particularly eagerto promote multilateral cooperative security. As a medium-sized country, we believe in multilateralism as a civilized way of dealing with regional or global issues. We see, in particular, a chance to strengthen peace and security through multilateral cooperation at regional levelamong countries sharing common security interests.

Another reason is that no other country in our neighborhood has suffered more than Korea as a result of the cruel geopolitical realities surrounding the Korean Peninsula.  By dint of its location at the epicenter of regional geopolitical tectonic plates where competing strategic interests of major powers intersect and all strategic fault lines in the region crisscross, Korea invariably ended up the hapless victim of rivalry among our big neighbors whenever we became too weak to take care of our own destiny.

Over a little more than a century, three major wars have been fought over primacy and hegemony on the Korean Peninsula, namely, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, and Korean War of 1950-3. The sheer complexity of the geopolitics surrounding the Korean Peninsula is attested to by the tenacity of the division which could not be resolved even with almost a million casualties from 18 States engaged in the Korean War and which has even survived the end of the Cold War.

For these and other reasons, the last thing we want to see in our neighborhood is the return of power politics in its most savage form accompanied by unbridled competition for power and influence, an arms race, and heightened tensions which could be fueled by a resurgence of nationalism. I do not believe that multilateralism will be a panacea or hedge against the return of power politics. However, it has at least a virtue of moderating the excesses vices of great power politics. It also gives a greater space to diplomacy.

Northeast Asia is undergoing a structural shift in the balance of power driven primarily by uneven economic performances. Some describe this from a global perspective as a shift in the center of gravity of the world to East Asia. However you characterize this phenomenon, in the regional security context, it adds up to complexity, volatility and uneasiness. Over time, fundamental changes in geoeconomics are bound to spill over into geopolitics and the strategic equation in the region.

Once nations come to possess unequal power resources, even if they try to exercise enormous restraint, it would becomeextremely difficult to resist the temptation to show their newly gained muscles, particularly when they cannot get their way through diplomacy alone and where their own interests clash with others’. Such logic of powerwould inevitably compel other countries to respond one way or another. That is why we have to guard against the danger of history repeating itself and the logic of power slipping out of control in our region.

I believe that most Northeast Asian countries will continue to meet their primary national security needs on their own or through the bilateral alliances shaped during the Cold War era. Multilateral security cooperation can never be a substitute for the existing security arrangements. It can at best complement them and fill the gaps left by the existing security structure. The most important value added it can create would be in the area of confidence building and non-traditional security threats, as well as in containing and managing sources of tension, friction and conflict.

With these objectives in mind, some serious efforts have been made in recent years to establish a consultative mechanism for security cooperation in Northeast Asia. The first such intergovernmental effort was undertaken by accident in the context of the Six Party Talks the central objective of which is the denuclearization of North Korea.  The September 19 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks of 2005 includes a paragraph in which the Six Parties agreed to explore ways and means for promoting security cooperation in Northeast Asia. As a follow-up to this Statement, the Six Parties decided in their February 13 agreement of 2007 to establish a Working Group on a Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism. Russia volunteered to assume the chairmanship and has managed to convene three meetings since then. This certainly is a landmark first step forward in the construction of regional security cooperation.

However, the fate of this Working Group could not escape from that of the Six Party Talks process. Despite enormous time and effort Russia has devoted thus far, as chair, to the launching and operation of the Working Group, the group has yet to work out the guiding principles or a charter on Northeast Asia Peace and Security, never mind embarking on any substantive work. As such, multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia still remains at an exploratory stage and has a long way to go before it evolves to the point of making a meaningful contribution to regional peace and security.

What we have in place is nothing more than an institutional foundation to engage in serious discussions on security cooperation. In short, Northeast Asia is barely at the stage of Europe in 1972 when the Helsinki Process was launched. Before Helsinki, Europe already had a history of multilateralism for centuries. In contrast, Northeast Asia is conspicuous in lacking a tradition of multilateralism. We have to start from scratch beginning with a talk shop and an agreement on the substance of the agenda.

It is a daunting task even to agree on what to talk about and build up the habit of discussing security issues among countries with divergent security interests and outlooks. It would be a real achievement if we could reach the point of being able to share even basic information on defense policies and expenditures.

As such, the biggest challenge ahead in building a multilateral security cooperation mechanism in Northeast Asia is how to fill enough substance into the agenda to keep the momentum alive and move the process forward. When it comes to issues of vital security interests, most countries may be tempted to rely on their own capabilities or on existing bilateral security arrangements. The bigger countries are inclined to broaden the scope of their own sovereignty and internal affairs and would try to exclude from the multilateral agenda any issues they do not feel comfortable consulting upon with others. Likewise, many issues other countries may wish to discuss in a multilateral setting would be deemed inappropriate by the countries directly concerned.

If we keep off the table any issues that any country would consider as pertaining to its expanded notion of sovereignty or domestic affairs, how much will be left in the substance of the agenda and will there still be room left for multilateralism? A comprehensive approach to security would be hollow if some countries are averse even to the reference to human rights or refugees. What we need most in Northeast Asia is expansion in the scope of shared values and a community of security interests.

The asymmetry of power distribution in Northeast Asia is not particularly conducive to effective multilateralism. The bigger countries tend to espouse a kind of exceptionalism and would feel more comfortable with a unilateral or bilateral approach than a multilateral one to the extent that they do not have to depend on potential adversaries in resolving issues of interest to them. For their part, the smaller countries may be instinctively wary of being taken for granted or marginalized in a multilateral setting dominated by their bigger neighbors. In sum, I would not argue that Northeast Asia is the most propitious part of the world for multilateralism to flourish.

Let me now turn to some salient variables which could have a decisive bearing on the future of security cooperation in Northeast Asia.

The first variable is the North Korean nuclear issue, which has proved to be by far the most intractable and dire threat to peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and the region as a whole. Enormous diplomatic capital has been expended over the past two decades to roll back North Korea’s nuclear programs. However, the North Korean nuclear issue is like the Sisyphean stone in the Greek myth which rolls down again every time it is pushed back to the top of the hill. Indeed, it rollsfurther down the hill each time it is moved back to the top.

Disproportionate capabilities to harm neighbors and disrupt the regional peace and security are all the more dangerous when they are in the hands of a totalitarian, unstable and unpredictable regime in the terminal throes of an existential crisis. Moreover, given that North Korea cannot indefinitely sustain the mounting weight of its failures, their nuclear capabilities are most likely to become loose nukes which could fall into the wrong hands once their system of control on the nuclear arsenal and fissile material breaks down. The collapse of a nuclear-armed North Korea would be far more disturbing than that of a denuclearized North Korea. That is another reason why we have no time to lose in denuclearizing North Korea.

The only positive outcome we have managed to reap from North Korea’s nuclear ambitions is the experiment of multilateralism through the Six Party Talks process. If progress can be achieved in such a daunting task as denuclearization through the Six-Party Talks process, multilateralism will have a better chance of success in other areas of security.

The second variable I have in mind is the unification of Korea. I do not believe that unification will occur tomorrow. However, it may not be an unrealistic fantasy, either. I am certain that the energy for unification keeps growing - inexorably. What we do not know is when and under what circumstances this energy will reach a critical mass. Although the North Korean leadership is attempting to seek salvation in a false sense of security, an illusion of security provided by rudimentary nuclear devices, in fact, their nuclear ambition will only exacerbate their existential crisis and precipitate the end of their regime.

In the regional security context, unification will reshape the geopolitical dynamics and strategic equation in Northeast Asia. In a divided Korea, the ROK’s power resources are largely consumed and squandered in dealing with the threat from North Korea. I am not as optimistic as Goldman Sachs which projected last year that the GDP of a unified Korea could surpass that of France, Germany and possibly Japan in 30-40 years, should the growth potential of North Korea be realized. Nevertheless, I can assure you that a unified Korea will build up enough economic and strategic weight of its own to be reckoned with in the regional geopolitical landscape. Equipped with far greater power resources, a unified Korea may have a positive role to play on the maintenance of the strategic stability of the region as the centerpiece of the balance of power in Northeast Asia.

Finally, there is the legacy of history which still weighs heavily on international relations in the region. Officially, apologies, half-hearted as they may be, have been offered and accepted. However, emotions are easily enflamed and old wounds are too often reopened before they are completely healed. In order to win the hearts and minds of afflicted neighbors, one has to reconcile with one’s own past before coming to terms with one’s neighbors. It is hard to build goodwill between neighbors who share an unfortunate past. But it is too easily undone through insensitive gestures or remarks.

In short, the ghosts of history stand in the way of harmonious relations and the construction of cooperative security in our region. Here again, Europe provides a shining example of what it takes to turn yesterday’s animosities into the friendships of today and tomorrow. How far we can move forward in building cooperative security depends not least on the degree to which we succeed in coming to terms with the past and taming the ghosts of history.

I am offering these observations of mine as a food for thought in your intellectual exercises today and tomorrow. I look forward to a productive outcome which will be a source of inspiration in our efforts to build an architecture of comprehensive security cooperation in this region.

Thank you.